Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, in Support of Neither Party by Chang, Robert S. et al.
Seattle University School of Law 
Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality Centers, Programs, and Events 
12-22-2011 
Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for 
Law and Equality, in Support of Neither Party 
Robert S. Chang 
Seattle University School of Law 
Lorraine K. Bannai 
Seattle University School of Law 
Robert C. Boruchowitz 
Seattle University School of Law 
David A. Perez 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/korematsu_center 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Fred T. Korematsu Ctr. for Law and Equal., in Support of Neither 
Party, Washington v. Meneese, No. 86203-9 (Wash. Dec. 22, 2011) 
This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Programs, and Events at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality by an authorized administrator of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more 




















Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality, in Support of Neither Party. 
 
 
Robert C. Chang 
WSBA No. 44083 
 
Lorraine K. Bannai,  
WSBA No. 20449 
 
 
Robert C. Boruchowitz 
WSBA No. 4563 
 
David A. Perez 





Seattle, WA 98122 
Tel: (206) 398-4133 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES  …………………………………………… ii  
 




I. Both Parties and the Court Below Misconstrue the  
“School Official” Exception by Conflating Police  
Officers with School Officials.  Police Officers Can  
Never Be Considered School Officials Under the  
Fourth Amendment. ……………………………………….... 2 
 
A. The “School Official” Exception Is Based on a  
Sharp Distinction Between Law Enforcement and  
School Officials. The Exception Was Intended to  
Apply Only to Teachers and Principals, Not Police 
Officers. …………………………………………………. 2 
 
B. Applying the School Official Exception to Police  
Would Concentrate Too Much Power into the Hands  
of Law Enforcement and Allow the Exception to  
Swallow the Rule. ……………………………………….. 8 
 
C. Limiting the School Official Exception to Teachers  
and Principals, Rather than Police Officers, Promotes 
School Safety While Safeguarding Constitutional  
Values. …………………………………………………. 10 
 
II. Allowing Police Officers to Search Students Under the  
School Official Exception Would Expose Students – 
Particularly Students of Color – To Increased and  
Earlier Contact with the Criminal Justice System. ………… 12 
 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
WASHINGTON STATE CASES 
 
State v. Afana, 169 Wn. 2d 169, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) ...………………... 3 
 
State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 13 P.3d 244 (2000) ………………... 6 
 
State v. Brooks, 43 Wn. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986) ……………….. 6 
 
State v. McKinnon, 88 Wn. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) ……………... 5, 6  
 
State v. Slattery, 56 Wn. App. 820, 787 P.2d 932 (1990) ……………….. 6 
 





New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733,  
83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) …………………………………………… passim 
 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633,  
174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009) ………………………………………………... 3 
 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 
733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) ……………………………………………. 8 
 
West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 











Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the 
Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 
336 (2003) ……………………………………………………………… 12 
 
Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School 
Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79 (2008) ……. 13 
 
JACQUELINE IRVINE, BLACK STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS (1990) ……………………………….. 14 
 
Justice Police Institute, Policy Brief, “Schools and Suspensions: Self-
Reported Crime and the Growing Use of Suspensions” (2001) ……….. 14 
 
Augustina Reyes, The Criminalization of Student Discipline Programs 
and Adolescent Behavior, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. OF L. COMM. 73 (2006) . 13, 14 
 
Seattle Public Schools, Student Information Services Office, “Full 2010 
Data Profile, District Summary (Dec. 2010) ………………………. 15, 16 
 
Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and 
Gender Disproportionality in School Punishment, Policy Research Report 
#SRS1 (June 2000) ………………………………………………… 14, 15  
 
Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education 
by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462 (2006) …………….. 14 
 
Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law 
Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y. L. REV. 977 





IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu 
Center”) is a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of 
Law that works to advance justice through research, advocacy, and 
education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing the legacy of 
Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders during World War II that 
ultimately led to the incarceration of 110,000 Japanese Americans. He 
took his challenge to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld his 
conviction in 1944 on the ground that the removal of Japanese Americans 
was justified by “military necessity.” Fred Korematsu went on to 
successfully vacate his conviction and to champion the cause of civil 
liberties and civil rights for all people. The Korematsu Center, inspired by 
his example, works to advance his legacy by promoting social justice for 
all. Accordingly, the Korematsu Center has a special interest in defending 
constitutional values for people of all ages, including students and youth.  
The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the 







I. Both Parties and the Court Below Misconstrue the “School 
Official” Exception by Conflating Police Officers with 
School Officials.  Police Officers Can Never Be Considered 
School Officials Under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
In their respective briefs, both parties rely on the faulty premise 
that police officers stationed at schools may qualify as “school officials” 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.
1
 Working from this assumption, but 
never questioning it, the parties simply dispute whether the police officer 
in this case qualified as a school official at the time of the search. The 
parties’ flawed assumption, however, misstates the threshold issue that the 
Court should consider first: that a police officer can never qualify as a 
school official under any circumstance. 
A. The “School Official” Exception Is Based on a Sharp 
Distinction Between Law Enforcement and School Officials. 
The Exception Was Intended to Apply Only to Teachers and 
Principals, Not Police Officers. 
 
The search in this case was conducted by a police officer, not a 
school official, and therefore cannot fall within the “school official” 
exception, even if the search took place at a school.  The ability of police 
officers to search an individual is subject to constitutional requirements.  
                                                 
1
 The Fourth Amendment states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.” U.S. const., amend. IV. 
3 
 
The Fourth Amendment “generally requires a law enforcement officer to 
have probable cause for conducting a search.” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. 
#1 v. Redding, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 
(2009). Similarly, the “authority of law” requirement in article I, section 7, 
of the State constitution requires officers to have a valid warrant, “subject 
to a few jealously guarded exceptions.” State v. Afana, 169 Wn.2d 169, 
177-78, 233 P.3d 879 (2010). “It is always the State’s burden to establish 
that such an exception applies.” Id. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court recognized that the 
school setting “requires some modification of the level of suspicion . . . 
needed to justify a search.” 469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 
2d 720 (1985). The Court reasoned that “requiring a teacher to obtain a 
warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules 
. . . would unduly interfere with the . . . informal disciplinary procedures 
needed in the schools.” Id. The Court held that for searches by school 
officials “a careful balancing of governmental and private interests 
suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness that stops shorts of probable cause. Id. at 341. 
The key issue in this case is the scope of the school official exception. 
 In crafting the exception, the Court made clear that the phrase 
“school official” did not include law enforcement:  
4 
 
We here consider only searches carried out by school 
authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This 
case does not present the question of the appropriate 
standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by 
school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law 
enforcement. 
 
Id. at 342 n.7. This clarification demonstrates that the Court never 
intended for the term “school official” to apply to law enforcement.
2
 
Justice Powell’s concurrence reiterated that the Court’s decision was 
based on the significant differences between teachers and police officers: 
The special relationship between teacher and student also 
distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren 
operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries 
of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility 
to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those 
who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and 
bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of 
adversarial relationship exist between [teachers] and [their] 
pupils. Instead, there is a commonality of interests between 
teachers and their pupils. . . . Unlike police officers, school 
authorities have no law enforcement responsibility or 
indeed any obligation to be familiar with the criminal laws. 
 
Id. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring). In the present case, a police officer 
stationed at a school, but nevertheless charged with the adversarial 
responsibility to investigate criminal activity and arrest those who violate 
our laws, conducted the search. The “special relationship” between teacher 
and student, which the Court found crucial in crafting its exception, does 
                                                 
2
 In fact, New Jersey argued in its brief in T.L.O. that “the history of the Fourth 
Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and 
seizures carried out by law enforcement officers.” Id. at 334. 
5 
 
not exist between police officer and student. Listing the officer as a 
member of the school staff, giving him office space in the building, and 
letting him participate in staff meetings, does not alter his status as law 
enforcement.
3
 Concluding otherwise would elevate form over substance. 
 Washington State’s own school exception rule, which pre-dates 
T.L.O., also relied upon a clear distinction between officers and school 
officials. In State v. McKinnon, this Court considered whether evidence 
seized by a high school principal was properly admitted at trial. 88 Wn. 2d 
75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). Foreshadowing the logic that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would employ eight years later in T.L.O., this Court wrote: 
The high school principal is not a law enforcement officer. 
His job does not concern the discovery and prevention of 
crime. His duty as the chief administrator of the high 
school includes a primary duty of maintaining order and 
discipline in the school. . . . [H]e should not be held to the 
same probable cause standard as law enforcement officers. . 
. . [F]or us to hold school officials to the standard of 
probable cause required of law enforcement officials would 
create an unreasonable burden upon these school officials. 
 
Id. at 81. Like the reasoning ultimately adopted in T.L.O., this Court’s 
                                                 
3
 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence strongly echoed the Court’s distinction between 
officers and school officials: “A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day 
experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer 
possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable 
cause. The time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that 
are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the 
teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education. A teacher’s 
focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing 




reasoning in McKinnon is incoherent if police officers may be considered 
school officials. This Court’s holding in McKinnon was premised on a 
sharp distinction that the parties effectively erase.
4
 Post-T.L.O. cases in 
Washington have universally applied the exception to searches conducted 
by teachers and principals. See State v. B.A.S., 103 Wn. App. 549, 13 
P.3d 244 (2000) (teacher);
5
 State v. Slattery, 56 Wn. App. 820, 787 P.2d 
932 (1990) (principal); State v. Sweeney, 56 Wn. App. 42, 782 P.2d 562 
(1989); State v. Brooks, 43 Wn. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986) (vice 
principal). Notably neither party cites to a single Washington case that has 
applied the exception to police officers. 
Maintaining the distinction between school officials and law 
enforcement also makes practical sense.  Constitutional protections against 
unlawful searches by police officers have developed because the 
consequences are high: arrest, detention, and the exposure to criminal 
                                                 
4
 In fact, the Court’s subsequent discussion about whether there existed “joint action” 
demonstrates how unworkable the school official exception would be if it included police 
officers. See McKinnon, 88 Wn. at 82 (“Although joint action by a law enforcement 
officer and a private person may constitute police action, joint action was not present in 
these cases.”). The joint action inquiry is endlessly circular if a police officer can qualify 
as a school official: any action by a school resource officer would constitute “joint 
action” because SROs would be considered both police and school officials. Surely, if the 
reasonable suspicion standard does not apply when an officer is directing a teacher or 
principal to conduct a search, it is not applicable where that same police officer conducts 
the search himself. 
5
 Although the Court in B.A.S. states that the “school attendance officer,” David Halford, 
conducted the search, 103 Wn.App. at 552, Mr. Halford is not a police officer. Mr. 
Halford began working at the school as a teacher, and is currently the school’s principal. 
See “Staff Page for David Halford,” available at 
http://swift.auburn.wednet.edu/arhs/dhalfordjr/index.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
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sanctions.  But in contrast, school administrators can search students based 
on a lower standard (reasonable suspicion) because students have 
diminished civil liberties while in the school setting and because the 
consequences for violating school rules are lower. For instance, students 
have no right to counsel or right to remain silent when summoned to the 
principal’s office.  Invoking either of these rights when questioned by a 
principal or teacher can lead to suspension. And, more specific to this 
case, students have diminished search and seizure protections when 
teachers or principals search their property. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
But courts have accepted diminished student liberties vis-à-vis school 
officials because the sanctions available to teachers and principals – 
detention and suspension – are not as severe as criminal sanctions. The 
protections are low because the stakes are low: teachers cannot detain 
students overnight, principals cannot handcuff students, and neither can 
arrest students – only police officers can do those things. 
The school official exception, as originally conceived by this Court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court, never contemplated a scenario in which a 
uniformed officer could invoke it to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. It 
was an exception narrowly tailored to the unique roles that teachers and 
principals play in our public education system. This Court should make 
clear that police officers are not school officials, even when they are 
8 
 
stationed at a school. 
B. Applying the School Official Exception to Police Would 
Concentrate Too Much Power into the Hands of Law 
Enforcement and Allow the Exception to Swallow the Rule. 
 
Just as students do not shed their constitutional rights at the 
schoolhouse gates, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969), police officers do 
not shed their badges at the schoolhouse gates. Nevertheless, the State 
urges this Court to expand the school official exception to include law 
enforcement officers who are stationed at schools. State’s Br. at 9-16. This 
shift is deceptively profound: in one fell-swoop the State eliminates the 
core distinction that separates the exception from the rule. 
The school official exception, as originally conceived, constituted 
a small concession of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in return for a 
greater guarantee of safety within schools. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. But 
the State’s broad reading warps this once narrow concession into a 
wholesale waiver, amputating the search and seizure clause from a 
student’s Bill of Rights. Under the State’s new rule, police officers can 
skirt the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment so long as 
they are stationed at a school. In effect, the State’s argument converts the 
narrow exception into a glaring loophole. 
Worse still, the State’s tortured logic would create a constitutional 
9 
 
chimera: one part law enforcement, one part school official. This new 
hybrid would retain the authority granted to all uniformed police officers, 
along with the ability to conduct searches like school teachers, 
unencumbered by traditional procedural requirements (such as probable 
cause). Too much power would be concentrated into the hands of police 
officers stationed at schools. Consider, for instance, an analogous scenario 
whereby school teachers, employing the reasonable suspicion standard, 
were given the authority to handcuff, arrest, and detain students overnight 
– effectively transforming them into “law enforcement teachers.” The 
latter scenario is essentially the same legal construct that the State 
advances in its brief: a state official with police powers who has the 
authority to search students under a lower constitutional standard. 
Additionally, the State’s new legal construct would violate the text 
and structure of the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment’s 
underlying command is that searches be reasonable.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
at 337. The first clause states the amendment’s purpose (“The right of the 
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated”), while the second clause defines the word 
“unreasonable” (“and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause”). 
U.S. const., amend. IV.  After T.L.O., whether a particular search is 
reasonable depends on who conducts the search.  For a law enforcement 
10 
 
search, the text and structure of the Fourth Amendment clearly states that 
a warrant or probable cause is required.  A somewhat lower standard 
(“reasonable suspicion”) applies to teachers.  Conflating the two would 
effectively rewrite the Fourth Amendment. 
C. Limiting the School Official Exception to Teachers and 
Principals, Rather than Police Officers, Promotes School 
Safety While Safeguarding Constitutional Values. 
 
The public interest in protecting schools is important, and cannot 
be overlooked. But this interest, however compelling, is adequately 
protected by the original exception crafted by the Supreme Court to allow 
teachers and school administrators to search students based only on 
reasonable suspicion. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342-43 (“This standard will, 
we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to 
maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon 
the privacy of schoolchildren.”). 
The frightful scenario the State presents, where school discipline 
would grind to a halt, and where students would remain in limbo and miss 
class while awaiting a search warrant, is a classic straw man. State Br. at 
10-11. First, it rests on the unfounded premise that police officers are 
schools officials. Second, limiting the school official exception to teachers 
and principals would not do away with the exception altogether. Requiring 
officers to obtain a warrant or show probable cause before conducting a 
11 
 
search would not burden teachers and principals, who would still be 
allowed to conduct searches under the lower standard of “reasonable 
suspicion.” The specter of teachers and administrators standing powerless 
to discipline any student who invokes the Fourth Amendment is a cynical 
attempt to scare this Court into abandoning its cardinal principles.
6
 
Notably, the State has cited no evidence – and there is none in the 
record – that shows how school safety would suffer if police officers 
abided by constitutional limitations. There is no reason to conclude that 
the exception ought to be expanded to include police officers.
7
  
One challenging aspect of this Court’s duty is to be continuously 
aware and alert to the ways in which expediency and convenience tend to 
crowd out our constitutional values in ways that are gradual and often 
imperceptible. While it may seem convenient to sacrifice student liberty to 
simplify and streamline police searches within schools, that convenience 
comes at too great a cost. It diminishes students’ respect for the education 
                                                 
6
 The State argues that because students are compelled to attend school their safety 
interests should override their constitutional interests. The State is incorrect. Precisely 
because school attendance is compulsory is it even more urgent to ensure that procedural 
protections are firmly in place to guard against whimsical violations of students’ rights. 
Otherwise, students who cannot attend private schools effectively would be compelled to 
waive their Fourth Amendment rights in order to go to school – a rather Faustian Bargain. 
7
 As discussed above, other constitutional exceptions apply only to teachers and 
principals, rather than officers, and with good reason. For instance, students cannot 
invoke their right against self-incrimination when principals or teachers interrogate them. 
If they do not answer, they face detention or suspension. But the same logic that the State 
employs to water down the search and seizure clause can just as easily apply to the Fifth 
Amendment. In this sense, the State’s troubling expansion of what constitutes a school 
official is not so much a slippery slope as it is a dangerous cliff. 
12 
 
system, facilitates alienation and mistrust between students and school 
officials, and disrupts the learning environment.
8
 “That [public schools] 
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection 
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the 
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943). In 
short, the State’s well-intentioned attempt to promote school safety would 
instead sacrifice student liberty and foster student cynicism. 
Amicus strongly supports efforts to make our schools safe and 
secure for all our students.  We believe that officers can play a vital role in 
fostering a safe school environment. That role must conform, however, to 
our constitutional principles. The State’s rule would undermine our 
constitution without appreciably increasing school safety. Adhering to the 
school official exception, as it was originally crafted – narrow, and based 
on a distinction between cops and teachers – would promote safety and 
constitutional values. 
  
                                                 
8
 Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the Disappearing 
Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 340-41 (2003). 
13 
 
II. Allowing Police Officers to Search Students Under the 
School Official Exception Would Expose Students – 
Particularly Students of Color – To Increased and Earlier 
Contact with the Criminal Justice System. 
 
Allowing police officers to search students on a lesser showing of 
reasonable cause will bring more students into contact with the criminal 
justice system, with dangerous consequences for students, especially 
students of color.  Over the past decade the number of students referred to 
court for school discipline has grown dramatically as student misbehavior 
has become increasingly criminalized.
9
  Allowing police officers to search 
students based on a lower standard, such as reasonable suspicion, would 
only contribute to this phenomenon.  In recent years, misbehavior that was 
traditionally settled by teachers and principals – such as a playground 
scrap or temper tantrum – is now handled by police officers stationed at 
schools.
10
 It is now clear that placing police in schools has raised the 
stakes for student misconduct.
11
 The increased prevalence of school arrests 
has had a devastating impact on students: those arrested are two to four 
times more likely to drop out of school, more likely to test poorly, and 
                                                 
9
 Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School Discipline in 
the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 80 (2008). 
10
 Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets 
Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y. L. REV. 977, 978 (2009/2010) (“Not surprisingly, 
behaviors such as schoolyard scuffles, shoving matches, and verbal altercations – once 
considered exclusively the domain of school disciplinarians – took on potentially sinister 
tones and came to be seen as requiring law enforcement intervention.”). 
11
 Augustina Reyes, The Criminalization of Student Discipline Programs and Adolescent 
Behavior, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. OF L. COMM. 73, 90 (2006) (“We as a society have extended a 
criminal incarceration approach to K-12 education.”). 
14 
 
more likely to enter the criminal justice system later in life.
12
  
Unfortunately, “these lessons have come mostly at the expense of 
minority children.”
13
 Indeed, extensive studies over the past thirty-five 
years have found that minority students tend be disciplined at a 
disproportionate rate.
14
 One major study found that Black and Latino 
students tend to be disciplined at a higher rate and for more severe 
violations than white students.
15
 For instance, Black students nationwide 
are two to five times more likely to be suspended.
16
 While Black students 
constitute only 17% of the K-12 population in the United States, they 
comprise 35% of all suspensions.
17
 Latinos fare no better.
18
 Although 
minority students are disciplined more often than white students, there is 
no evidence to suggest that Black and Latino students act out more often.
19
 
Worse still, the disproportionality increases as the severity of the sanctions 
                                                 
12
 Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest 
and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 473, 478-79 (2006). 
13
 Reyes, supra note 11, at 79. 
14
 Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender 
Disproportionality in School Punishment, Policy Research Report #SRS1, at *1-2 (June 
2000), available at www.iub.edu/~safeschl/cod.pdf (last visited: Dec. 21, 2011). 
15
 Reyes, supra note 11, at 96. 
16
 JACQUELINE IRVINE, BLACK STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, 
AND PRESCRIPTIONS 16-17 (1990). 
17
 Id. at 17. 
18
 Justice Police Institute, Policy Brief, “Schools and Suspensions: Self-Reported Crime 
and the Growing Use of Suspensions,”(2001) available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/2058 (last visited Dec. 21, 2011). 
19
 Skiba, supra note 14, at *6 (“Despite the ubiquity of findings concerning the 
relationship between race and behavior-related consequences, investigation of behavior, 
race, and discipline have yet to provide evidence that African American students 





 Therefore, with the proliferation of police officers in schools, 
studies have found that students of color, low-income students,
21
 and 
students with disabilities are more likely to be arrested in school.
22
 In 
short, Black and Latino boys have borne the brunt of this criminalization 
of school discipline, worsening an already intractable achievement gap.
23
  
The disproportionalities in Washington schools are just as 
sobering. For instance, during the 2009-2010 school year, there were 864 
total short-term suspensions in the Seattle School District.
24
 Although 
Black students comprise only 20% of the Seattle School District, they 
received 48.7% (421) of the suspensions, while Latino students, who 
comprise only 11.8% of the student population, received 15.4% (133) of 
the suspensions.
25
 Similar disproportionalities exist in elementary and 
middle schools.
26
 These disproportionalities have persisted over the last 17 
years.
27
 Moreover, as the punishment becomes more severe, so does the 
disproportionality. For instance, there were 313 total long term 
                                                 
20
 Skiba, supra note 14, at *17. 
21
 However, one study found that “socioeconomic status had virtually no effect when 
used as a covariate in a test of racial differences in office referrals and suspensions. 
Indeed disciplinary disproportionality by socioeconomic status appears to be a somewhat 
less robust finding than gender or racial disparity.” Skiba, supra note 14, at *15. 
22
 Thurau & Wald, supra note 10, at 980. 
23
 Id. at 78-79. 
24
 Seattle Public Schools, Student Information Services Office, “Full 2010 Data Profile, 
District Summary, December 2010,” at *103, available at 
http://www.seattleschools.org/modules/groups/homepagefiles/cms/1583136/File/Departm
ental%20Content/siso/disprof/2010/disprof_2010.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2011). 
25
 See id. at 11 and 103. 
26
 Id. at 105-07. 
27
 Id. at 104 (racial breakdown of short term suspensions between 1992 – 2010). 
16 
 
suspensions in the Seattle School District in 2009-2010, and Black 
students received 50.7% of them.
28
 Overall, 4.5% of Black students and 
4.6% of Latino students will receive a long-term suspension, compared to 
just 0.8% of White students.
29
 Like the rest of the country, Washington 
State’s public schools mete out school discipline in a racially 
disproportionate way. 
Blurring the line between school sanctions and criminal sanctions 
by extending the school official exception to police officers would 
exacerbate this disproportionality and contribute to the criminalization of 
school discipline. Minority students already face a higher likelihood of 
suspension, expulsion, and arrest. Instead of promoting school safety and 




Both parties rely on the legal fiction that police officers may be 
considered school officials for Fourth Amendment purposes to search 
students’ property without a warrant or a finding of probable cause. But 
the school official exception, as crafted by this Court and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, depends on a sharp distinction between police and school 
authorities. Safety interests cannot override this distinction because 
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allowing officers to circumvent the Fourth Amendment would not 
promote student safety – it would promote student cynicism.  
Ultimately, the constitutional protections associated with school 
discipline vis-à-vis teachers and principals are watered down because the 
consequences are watered down.  School authorities cannot arrest or 
detain students, nor can they expose students to criminal sanctions. But if 
the State’s hybrid legal construct is accepted, the stakes will increase 
drastically without a commensurate increase in constitutional protections. 
All students stand to suffer, but because school discipline is already meted 
out in a racially disproportionate way, minority students have the most to 
lose. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should REVERSE the 
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